Tuesday, February 21, 2006
Notes for Thursday, Feb. 23, 2006
Read to p. 206. Locke, Berkeley, Hume.
John Locke (1632-1704) Note that although Locke is cited as "the first of the classical British empiricists," we have already discussed the work of Thomas Hobbes, who is also considered an empiricist. But Hobbes did not work out a full-fledged empiricist philosophy as did Locke.
His epistemology. Like all empiricists, Locke rejected the notion of innate ideas; he replaced it with that of the tabula rasa, or blank slate theory of knowledge. All knowledge is derived from experience. He divided ideas into simple and complex (red is a simple "idea" or sense datum, apple is complex, being made up of several simple "ideas"), and qualities into primary and secondary. This latter distinction can be traced, through Descartes and Galileo, back to Democritus. Primary qualities are inherent in external objects; secondary qualities exist only in the mind, though they are caused by primary qualities. Locke's attitude toward the "substance," which would seem to be a necessary assumption in order for the qualities to be qualities of something, is noncommittal and a bit puzzling within the framework of his general epistemology.
His political theory. His "state of nature" quite different (and luckier) than that of Hobbes. Locke believes in "God-given" rights. Much of the thinking incorporated by the Founding Fathers into our Declaration of Independence comes from Locke. Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. All men are created equal. Note the assumption that man was created, as well as the counterintuitive idea of all men being equal. In what sense?
Berkeley (pronounced "Barkley") 1685-1753
The second British empiricist, who ends up being a sort of subjective idealist. His critique of Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Our only access to primary qualities is via secondary ones. In fact, the so-called primary qualities are really but interpretations of the so-called secondary ones. But if the primary qualities are only interpretations of secondary qualities, then they too must only exist in the mind. Hence Berkeley's principle, esse est percipi (to be is to be perceived). Berkeley's distinction between direct and indirect perception. Direct, the sense data; indirect (or mediate), interpretation of the sense data. Note disappearance of "substance," and growing importance of language, as the medium of intersubjectivity, which overcomes solipsism and moves in the direction of objectivity. God plays the role of assuring that things will remain as we left them (provided nothing has occurred to change their disposition), a role later dubbed the constancy hypothesis.
David Hume (1711-1776)
Author of A Treatise of Human Understanding at age 27. It "fell stillborn from the press," he lamented. Second version published as An Inquiry Concerning the Human Understanding. Hume calls Leibniz's analytic ideas "relations of ideas," and his synthetic ideas "matters of fact." Acting as a good empiricist, Hume labels all relations of ideas as tautological. That is to say, redundant and empty of new information. Only matters of fact "matter." Hume's fork. A series of yes/no questions that we can address to any proposition to determine whether it is analytic (hence trivial because self-evident), synthetic (a matter of fact sort of statement, traceable to sense data, hence possibly true and a real addition to our knowledge of the world) or neither, in which case it is "nonsense." Consider the statement "God exists" in the connection. Hume's critique of causality. Not analytic. Synthetic? Only seemingly. In fact, the notion of causality has three components: priority, contiguity and necessary connection. Only the first two can be traced to sense data (or experience). The necessary connection is not observable, and seems to amount to nothing more than a psychological expectation of what will happen. This is the problem of induction. We cannot "beg the question" (petitio principii) by saying that because event A was always followed by event A in the past it must therefore happen that way in the future. The notion of the self also falls before Hume's fork. Hume leaves philosophy (specifically, metaphysics) in a state of crisis that will be taken up by Emmanuel Kant, the next great philosopher on our program.
John Locke (1632-1704) Note that although Locke is cited as "the first of the classical British empiricists," we have already discussed the work of Thomas Hobbes, who is also considered an empiricist. But Hobbes did not work out a full-fledged empiricist philosophy as did Locke.
His epistemology. Like all empiricists, Locke rejected the notion of innate ideas; he replaced it with that of the tabula rasa, or blank slate theory of knowledge. All knowledge is derived from experience. He divided ideas into simple and complex (red is a simple "idea" or sense datum, apple is complex, being made up of several simple "ideas"), and qualities into primary and secondary. This latter distinction can be traced, through Descartes and Galileo, back to Democritus. Primary qualities are inherent in external objects; secondary qualities exist only in the mind, though they are caused by primary qualities. Locke's attitude toward the "substance," which would seem to be a necessary assumption in order for the qualities to be qualities of something, is noncommittal and a bit puzzling within the framework of his general epistemology.
His political theory. His "state of nature" quite different (and luckier) than that of Hobbes. Locke believes in "God-given" rights. Much of the thinking incorporated by the Founding Fathers into our Declaration of Independence comes from Locke. Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. All men are created equal. Note the assumption that man was created, as well as the counterintuitive idea of all men being equal. In what sense?
Berkeley (pronounced "Barkley") 1685-1753
The second British empiricist, who ends up being a sort of subjective idealist. His critique of Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Our only access to primary qualities is via secondary ones. In fact, the so-called primary qualities are really but interpretations of the so-called secondary ones. But if the primary qualities are only interpretations of secondary qualities, then they too must only exist in the mind. Hence Berkeley's principle, esse est percipi (to be is to be perceived). Berkeley's distinction between direct and indirect perception. Direct, the sense data; indirect (or mediate), interpretation of the sense data. Note disappearance of "substance," and growing importance of language, as the medium of intersubjectivity, which overcomes solipsism and moves in the direction of objectivity. God plays the role of assuring that things will remain as we left them (provided nothing has occurred to change their disposition), a role later dubbed the constancy hypothesis.
David Hume (1711-1776)
Author of A Treatise of Human Understanding at age 27. It "fell stillborn from the press," he lamented. Second version published as An Inquiry Concerning the Human Understanding. Hume calls Leibniz's analytic ideas "relations of ideas," and his synthetic ideas "matters of fact." Acting as a good empiricist, Hume labels all relations of ideas as tautological. That is to say, redundant and empty of new information. Only matters of fact "matter." Hume's fork. A series of yes/no questions that we can address to any proposition to determine whether it is analytic (hence trivial because self-evident), synthetic (a matter of fact sort of statement, traceable to sense data, hence possibly true and a real addition to our knowledge of the world) or neither, in which case it is "nonsense." Consider the statement "God exists" in the connection. Hume's critique of causality. Not analytic. Synthetic? Only seemingly. In fact, the notion of causality has three components: priority, contiguity and necessary connection. Only the first two can be traced to sense data (or experience). The necessary connection is not observable, and seems to amount to nothing more than a psychological expectation of what will happen. This is the problem of induction. We cannot "beg the question" (petitio principii) by saying that because event A was always followed by event A in the past it must therefore happen that way in the future. The notion of the self also falls before Hume's fork. Hume leaves philosophy (specifically, metaphysics) in a state of crisis that will be taken up by Emmanuel Kant, the next great philosopher on our program.
# posted by Michael @ 10:30 PM 
