Sunday, February 19, 2006
Notes for Tuesday, Feb. 21, 2006
Read to p. 184. Hobbes, Spinoza, Leibniz.
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). Hobbes's materialism is obtained by simply canceling one side of Descartes' dualism. (This makes him a bit different from the so-called Greek materialists, in which some matter (e.g. water, for Thales) was thought of more as an element in which various attributes slumbered than as pure matter in the modern sense. He was a "soft determinist." Hobbes's hard realism and pessimism. The impossibility of altruism. Life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short." It is "the war of all against all." Peace is a truce at best. The "social contract" assures a modicum of order. Unjust laws are better than no laws at all, in his opinion. Law and order take precedence over justice. (There may be some grounds for this: law and order might be looked upon as more primary, being the necessary precondition for justice. But from another point of view--namely a teleological one--we could say that justice is the purpose of law and order, and that there is always a danger of this purpose being forgotten.)
Hobbes's best-known work is his Leviathan (an allusion to the giant sea-creature described in Job 40:25-41:26), published in 1651.
INTRODUCTION
Baruch (later Benedict) Spinoza (1634-1677) was excommunicated by the Jews of his native Amsterdam in 1656, because he believed God and Nature to be the same (Deus sive natura), and God to be the mechanical principle of the universe, without personality. He was more rigorously or systematically rationalistic than Descartes (compare their two systems, p. 176). The definition of substance precludes the possibility of their being more than one. Body and mind are two aspects of the same thing. Necesssity reigns in the universe: there is no free will. His most important work, the Ethics, was published posthumously.
Leibniz (1646-1716). Creator of symbolic logic and inventor of calculating machine, co-creator (?) with Sir Isaac Newton of the calculus. Divided all propositions into analytic and synthetic.
Discuss chart on p. 179 in detail. This distinction is important and will be taken up by Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-76). Leibniz draws the surprising conclusion that sub specie aeterntatis (from the point of view of eternity) all true statements are necessarily true, and thus all analytic. Necessary and sufficient reasons. Internal harmony. Leibniz was a polymath, and is the author of the Theodicee, as well as a host of other works on mathematics, logic and the natural sciences. His theory of the monad as the minimal conscious "substance" remains a peculiarity of his philosophy that has not been taken up by subsequent philosophers.
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). Hobbes's materialism is obtained by simply canceling one side of Descartes' dualism. (This makes him a bit different from the so-called Greek materialists, in which some matter (e.g. water, for Thales) was thought of more as an element in which various attributes slumbered than as pure matter in the modern sense. He was a "soft determinist." Hobbes's hard realism and pessimism. The impossibility of altruism. Life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short." It is "the war of all against all." Peace is a truce at best. The "social contract" assures a modicum of order. Unjust laws are better than no laws at all, in his opinion. Law and order take precedence over justice. (There may be some grounds for this: law and order might be looked upon as more primary, being the necessary precondition for justice. But from another point of view--namely a teleological one--we could say that justice is the purpose of law and order, and that there is always a danger of this purpose being forgotten.)
Hobbes's best-known work is his Leviathan (an allusion to the giant sea-creature described in Job 40:25-41:26), published in 1651.
INTRODUCTION
NATURE (the art whereby God hath made and governs the world) is by the art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an artificial animal. For seeing life is but a motion of limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principal part within, why may we not say that all automata (engines that move themselves by springs and wheels as doth a watch) have an artificial life? For what is the heart, but a spring; and the nerves, but so many strings; and the joints, but so many wheels, giving motion to the whole body, such as was intended by the Artificer? Art goes yet further, imitating that rational and most excellent work of Nature, man. For by art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMONWEALTH, or STATE (in Latin, CIVITAS), which is but an artificial man, though of greater stature and strength than the natural, for whose protection and defence it was intended; and in which the sovereignty is an artificial soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body; the magistrates and other officers of judicature and execution, artificial joints; reward and punishment (by which fastened to the seat of the sovereignty, every joint and member is moved to perform his duty) are the nerves, that do the same in the body natural; the wealth and riches of all the particular members are the strength; salus populi (the people's safety) its business; counsellors, by whom all things needful for it to know are suggested unto it, are the memory; equity and laws, an artificial reason and will; concord, health; sedition, sickness; and civil war, death. Lastly, the pacts and covenants, by which the parts of this body politic were at first made, set together, and united, resemble that fiat, or the Let us make man, pronounced by God in the Creation.For a full-text online version, cf. Leviathan
Baruch (later Benedict) Spinoza (1634-1677) was excommunicated by the Jews of his native Amsterdam in 1656, because he believed God and Nature to be the same (Deus sive natura), and God to be the mechanical principle of the universe, without personality. He was more rigorously or systematically rationalistic than Descartes (compare their two systems, p. 176). The definition of substance precludes the possibility of their being more than one. Body and mind are two aspects of the same thing. Necesssity reigns in the universe: there is no free will. His most important work, the Ethics, was published posthumously.
Leibniz (1646-1716). Creator of symbolic logic and inventor of calculating machine, co-creator (?) with Sir Isaac Newton of the calculus. Divided all propositions into analytic and synthetic.
Discuss chart on p. 179 in detail. This distinction is important and will be taken up by Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-76). Leibniz draws the surprising conclusion that sub specie aeterntatis (from the point of view of eternity) all true statements are necessarily true, and thus all analytic. Necessary and sufficient reasons. Internal harmony. Leibniz was a polymath, and is the author of the Theodicee, as well as a host of other works on mathematics, logic and the natural sciences. His theory of the monad as the minimal conscious "substance" remains a peculiarity of his philosophy that has not been taken up by subsequent philosophers.
# posted by Michael @ 10:18 AM 
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I had a qestion concerning Spinoza's chart on pg. 176. I was wondering why the soul was not included in the finite attributes. I realize that God is the infinite substance, and some would consider this the sould, but God can be considered separate from the soul. For example, animals are not thought to have a soul, but God still exists separate from them. I always consider mind, body, and soul when I think about the elements of a human, so I was wondering why this was not included
# posted by 
: 2:47 PM, February 21, 2006
: 2:47 PM, February 21, 2006
Whitney, before I attempt to answer your question, a have a question about your question. Your general question seems to be why, in Spinoza's system, the soul does not constitute a finite attribute alongside mind and body. You surmise in passing that the soul might be considered to be part of God (or Nature), i.e. infinite substance. The part of your question that I do not understand is where you say "but God can be considered separate from the soul. For example, animals are not thought to have a soul, but God still exists separate from them." What exactly is this an example of?
Despite this one obscure point, I believe I understand what you are asking. Spinoza does not make a clear distinction (at least in the texts with which I am familiar) between soul and mind. As a Cartesian, he really only has the two ways of being that we find in Descartes: namely, res extensa (extended being) and res cogitans (thinking being). Spinoza simply places these two "finite substances" in the category of finite attributes in his own system. When Spinoza does mention soul, it is to deny that it is immortal in any personal sense. In fact he denies that there is a God in any personal sense. To the extent that the mind (or soul) thinks pure and lofty thoughts, it is closer to God, but it ceases being an ego, or an "I."
Our western tradition often has made an interesting distinction between mind and soul. Sometimes the distinction is made in the form of spirit (or mind) and soul. Sometimes a similar distinction is drawn between animus (masculine) and anima (feminine). More generally the mind has been associated with thought and dispassionate intellect, and the soul with affectivity (feelings and emotions). In this sense, the soul is thought of as being more closely allied to the body than is the mind.
One last comment. It would be a mistake to pose the problem of whether the soul is a part of infinite substance or a finite attribute, because the attributes are mere aspects of infinite substance in Spinoza. So everything in God (or Nature) is infinite substance, and the attributes are merely what we are able to perceive of that inifinite substance.
Despite this one obscure point, I believe I understand what you are asking. Spinoza does not make a clear distinction (at least in the texts with which I am familiar) between soul and mind. As a Cartesian, he really only has the two ways of being that we find in Descartes: namely, res extensa (extended being) and res cogitans (thinking being). Spinoza simply places these two "finite substances" in the category of finite attributes in his own system. When Spinoza does mention soul, it is to deny that it is immortal in any personal sense. In fact he denies that there is a God in any personal sense. To the extent that the mind (or soul) thinks pure and lofty thoughts, it is closer to God, but it ceases being an ego, or an "I."
Our western tradition often has made an interesting distinction between mind and soul. Sometimes the distinction is made in the form of spirit (or mind) and soul. Sometimes a similar distinction is drawn between animus (masculine) and anima (feminine). More generally the mind has been associated with thought and dispassionate intellect, and the soul with affectivity (feelings and emotions). In this sense, the soul is thought of as being more closely allied to the body than is the mind.
One last comment. It would be a mistake to pose the problem of whether the soul is a part of infinite substance or a finite attribute, because the attributes are mere aspects of infinite substance in Spinoza. So everything in God (or Nature) is infinite substance, and the attributes are merely what we are able to perceive of that inifinite substance.
Thank you for answering my question. Sorry if it was confusing, but your answer was sufficiant, and I understand now. Thanks! Whitney
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# posted by : 12:20 PM, February 22, 2006
: 12:20 PM, February 22, 2006 << Home
