Saturday, February 25, 2006
Notes for Tuesday, Feb. 28, 2006
Read to p. 222. Kant
Emmanuel Kant (1724-1904)
Kant's attempt to synthesize rationalism and Hume's philosophy in his Critique of Pure Reason (1781), aka his First Critique (by way of contrast with his Second Critique, the Critique of Practical Reason, published seven years later). Kant agrees with Hume that all analytic propositions (i.e. "relations of ideas") are a priori, but not that all synthetic propositions ("matters of fact") are a posteriori. There are some synthetic a priori propositions (cf. p. 208). Kant begins by dividing up the human mind into "faculties," namely intuition (perception), understanding and reason. He performs a transcendental analysis of each faculty, by asking what makes each faculty possible. Perception is made possible by the synthetic a priori conditions of time and space. Time and space are never perceived directly: they are rather the precondition of all perception, in that we perceive things only in time and in space. Kant calls this method of analysis "transcendental deduction," because it goes beyond or transcends direct observation. Moving on to the faculty of understanding (Verstand), Kant discovers what he calls "the categories of the understanding," i.e. the synthetic a priori foundations of the understanding: unity/plurality/totality, causality, and substantiality. The mind brings these to reality, rather than discovering them through experience. (Of course this raises the question of the ontological status of these categories. Are they subjective, objective, or perhaps something other than either of these alternatives? Since the categories themselves are not within the domain of experience (which they make possible), they are not phenomena, but noumena: entities beyond what humans can perceive. (Hence we can only "deduce" their existence; Kant also calls them "the intellectual form of all experience.") Kant distinguishes a third faculty, which he calls pure reason. Its internal categories are the concepts of pure reason. In this, the longest section of the book, Kant shows that it is impossible to prove the concepts of pure reason (pure in the sense of unadulterated by empirical knowledge). Detailed discussion of this area, which is the true object of Kant's critique, is beyond the scope of this course. We can, however, gain a sense of the why Kant thought a critique of pure reason (and of the metaphysics it generates) was necessary. It was important for Kant to show that pure reason leads the philosopher to make claims to a sort of knowledge that is beyond its grasp. By showing the limits of reason's reach, he wished to make a place for faith, i.e. belief.
Two works in which Kant develops his deontology (or ethics based on the concept of duty) are the Second Critique (the Critique of Practical Reason) and the Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals. There he posits freedom as if it were grounded in a synthetic a priori truth, on develops a series of moral maxims, or principled rules of conduct. In discovering these rules Kant applies the categorical imperative: "Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." Another formulation of the categorical imperative was: "Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person, or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only." It is noteworthy that Kant based his ethics on duty, not on feelings (such as sympathy for the suffering of others). Kant's attempt to base ethics soley on reason is typical of the thinking of the (18th-century) Enlightenment period.
Emmanuel Kant (1724-1904)
Kant's attempt to synthesize rationalism and Hume's philosophy in his Critique of Pure Reason (1781), aka his First Critique (by way of contrast with his Second Critique, the Critique of Practical Reason, published seven years later). Kant agrees with Hume that all analytic propositions (i.e. "relations of ideas") are a priori, but not that all synthetic propositions ("matters of fact") are a posteriori. There are some synthetic a priori propositions (cf. p. 208). Kant begins by dividing up the human mind into "faculties," namely intuition (perception), understanding and reason. He performs a transcendental analysis of each faculty, by asking what makes each faculty possible. Perception is made possible by the synthetic a priori conditions of time and space. Time and space are never perceived directly: they are rather the precondition of all perception, in that we perceive things only in time and in space. Kant calls this method of analysis "transcendental deduction," because it goes beyond or transcends direct observation. Moving on to the faculty of understanding (Verstand), Kant discovers what he calls "the categories of the understanding," i.e. the synthetic a priori foundations of the understanding: unity/plurality/totality, causality, and substantiality. The mind brings these to reality, rather than discovering them through experience. (Of course this raises the question of the ontological status of these categories. Are they subjective, objective, or perhaps something other than either of these alternatives? Since the categories themselves are not within the domain of experience (which they make possible), they are not phenomena, but noumena: entities beyond what humans can perceive. (Hence we can only "deduce" their existence; Kant also calls them "the intellectual form of all experience.") Kant distinguishes a third faculty, which he calls pure reason. Its internal categories are the concepts of pure reason. In this, the longest section of the book, Kant shows that it is impossible to prove the concepts of pure reason (pure in the sense of unadulterated by empirical knowledge). Detailed discussion of this area, which is the true object of Kant's critique, is beyond the scope of this course. We can, however, gain a sense of the why Kant thought a critique of pure reason (and of the metaphysics it generates) was necessary. It was important for Kant to show that pure reason leads the philosopher to make claims to a sort of knowledge that is beyond its grasp. By showing the limits of reason's reach, he wished to make a place for faith, i.e. belief.
Reason, in order to arrive at these [the concepts of God, freedom and immortality], must use principles which are intended originally for objects of possible experience only, and which, if in spite of this, they are applied to what cannot be an object of experience, really changes this into a phenomenon, thus rendering all practical extension of pure reason impossible. I had therefore to remove knowledge, in order to make room for belief [Glauben]. For the dogmatism of metaphysics, that is, the presumption that it is possible to achieve anything in metaphysics without a previous criticism of pure reason, is the source of all that unbelief, which is always very dogmatical, and wars against all morality (Critique of Pure Reason, tr. Müller, 1966, p. xxxix-xl).Thus the Critique of Pure Reason leaves the door open to belief (or faith). It does more than that. It makes a clear distinction between knowledge and belief, and justifies the latter on the basis of practical reason. ("Practical" reason for Kant is pragmatic reason, i.e. reason as applied to the conduct of our everyday lives. It does not have connotation it sometimes has in current English usage of expediency or unprincipled rationalization.) We thus have the right to believe in God, the soul, immortality, justice and freedom, even though we cannot claim to know that they exist, provided these beliefs enhance the moral quality of our lives.
Two works in which Kant develops his deontology (or ethics based on the concept of duty) are the Second Critique (the Critique of Practical Reason) and the Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals. There he posits freedom as if it were grounded in a synthetic a priori truth, on develops a series of moral maxims, or principled rules of conduct. In discovering these rules Kant applies the categorical imperative: "Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." Another formulation of the categorical imperative was: "Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person, or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only." It is noteworthy that Kant based his ethics on duty, not on feelings (such as sympathy for the suffering of others). Kant's attempt to base ethics soley on reason is typical of the thinking of the (18th-century) Enlightenment period.
# posted by Michael @ 7:06 AM 
