Sunday, February 26, 2006
Midterm Exam: March 2, 2006
To take your Midterm Exam, report directly to the computer lab in the Science Building.The room is Science 228. To get there from the main entrance, take the stairs to the second floor, take a right then an immediate left. You'll pass the restrooms on the left, take a left then an immediate right and it's down the hall on the left. Basically it's straight back at the back of the building.
Be punctual. You must print out and turn in your answers (the questions will be distributed in the lab) promptly, no later than 4:45.
Be punctual. You must print out and turn in your answers (the questions will be distributed in the lab) promptly, no later than 4:45.
Saturday, February 25, 2006
Notes for Tuesday, Feb. 28, 2006
Read to p. 222. Kant
Emmanuel Kant (1724-1904)
Kant's attempt to synthesize rationalism and Hume's philosophy in his Critique of Pure Reason (1781), aka his First Critique (by way of contrast with his Second Critique, the Critique of Practical Reason, published seven years later). Kant agrees with Hume that all analytic propositions (i.e. "relations of ideas") are a priori, but not that all synthetic propositions ("matters of fact") are a posteriori. There are some synthetic a priori propositions (cf. p. 208). Kant begins by dividing up the human mind into "faculties," namely intuition (perception), understanding and reason. He performs a transcendental analysis of each faculty, by asking what makes each faculty possible. Perception is made possible by the synthetic a priori conditions of time and space. Time and space are never perceived directly: they are rather the precondition of all perception, in that we perceive things only in time and in space. Kant calls this method of analysis "transcendental deduction," because it goes beyond or transcends direct observation. Moving on to the faculty of understanding (Verstand), Kant discovers what he calls "the categories of the understanding," i.e. the synthetic a priori foundations of the understanding: unity/plurality/totality, causality, and substantiality. The mind brings these to reality, rather than discovering them through experience. (Of course this raises the question of the ontological status of these categories. Are they subjective, objective, or perhaps something other than either of these alternatives? Since the categories themselves are not within the domain of experience (which they make possible), they are not phenomena, but noumena: entities beyond what humans can perceive. (Hence we can only "deduce" their existence; Kant also calls them "the intellectual form of all experience.") Kant distinguishes a third faculty, which he calls pure reason. Its internal categories are the concepts of pure reason. In this, the longest section of the book, Kant shows that it is impossible to prove the concepts of pure reason (pure in the sense of unadulterated by empirical knowledge). Detailed discussion of this area, which is the true object of Kant's critique, is beyond the scope of this course. We can, however, gain a sense of the why Kant thought a critique of pure reason (and of the metaphysics it generates) was necessary. It was important for Kant to show that pure reason leads the philosopher to make claims to a sort of knowledge that is beyond its grasp. By showing the limits of reason's reach, he wished to make a place for faith, i.e. belief.
Two works in which Kant develops his deontology (or ethics based on the concept of duty) are the Second Critique (the Critique of Practical Reason) and the Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals. There he posits freedom as if it were grounded in a synthetic a priori truth, on develops a series of moral maxims, or principled rules of conduct. In discovering these rules Kant applies the categorical imperative: "Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." Another formulation of the categorical imperative was: "Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person, or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only." It is noteworthy that Kant based his ethics on duty, not on feelings (such as sympathy for the suffering of others). Kant's attempt to base ethics soley on reason is typical of the thinking of the (18th-century) Enlightenment period.
Emmanuel Kant (1724-1904)
Kant's attempt to synthesize rationalism and Hume's philosophy in his Critique of Pure Reason (1781), aka his First Critique (by way of contrast with his Second Critique, the Critique of Practical Reason, published seven years later). Kant agrees with Hume that all analytic propositions (i.e. "relations of ideas") are a priori, but not that all synthetic propositions ("matters of fact") are a posteriori. There are some synthetic a priori propositions (cf. p. 208). Kant begins by dividing up the human mind into "faculties," namely intuition (perception), understanding and reason. He performs a transcendental analysis of each faculty, by asking what makes each faculty possible. Perception is made possible by the synthetic a priori conditions of time and space. Time and space are never perceived directly: they are rather the precondition of all perception, in that we perceive things only in time and in space. Kant calls this method of analysis "transcendental deduction," because it goes beyond or transcends direct observation. Moving on to the faculty of understanding (Verstand), Kant discovers what he calls "the categories of the understanding," i.e. the synthetic a priori foundations of the understanding: unity/plurality/totality, causality, and substantiality. The mind brings these to reality, rather than discovering them through experience. (Of course this raises the question of the ontological status of these categories. Are they subjective, objective, or perhaps something other than either of these alternatives? Since the categories themselves are not within the domain of experience (which they make possible), they are not phenomena, but noumena: entities beyond what humans can perceive. (Hence we can only "deduce" their existence; Kant also calls them "the intellectual form of all experience.") Kant distinguishes a third faculty, which he calls pure reason. Its internal categories are the concepts of pure reason. In this, the longest section of the book, Kant shows that it is impossible to prove the concepts of pure reason (pure in the sense of unadulterated by empirical knowledge). Detailed discussion of this area, which is the true object of Kant's critique, is beyond the scope of this course. We can, however, gain a sense of the why Kant thought a critique of pure reason (and of the metaphysics it generates) was necessary. It was important for Kant to show that pure reason leads the philosopher to make claims to a sort of knowledge that is beyond its grasp. By showing the limits of reason's reach, he wished to make a place for faith, i.e. belief.
Reason, in order to arrive at these [the concepts of God, freedom and immortality], must use principles which are intended originally for objects of possible experience only, and which, if in spite of this, they are applied to what cannot be an object of experience, really changes this into a phenomenon, thus rendering all practical extension of pure reason impossible. I had therefore to remove knowledge, in order to make room for belief [Glauben]. For the dogmatism of metaphysics, that is, the presumption that it is possible to achieve anything in metaphysics without a previous criticism of pure reason, is the source of all that unbelief, which is always very dogmatical, and wars against all morality (Critique of Pure Reason, tr. Müller, 1966, p. xxxix-xl).Thus the Critique of Pure Reason leaves the door open to belief (or faith). It does more than that. It makes a clear distinction between knowledge and belief, and justifies the latter on the basis of practical reason. ("Practical" reason for Kant is pragmatic reason, i.e. reason as applied to the conduct of our everyday lives. It does not have connotation it sometimes has in current English usage of expediency or unprincipled rationalization.) We thus have the right to believe in God, the soul, immortality, justice and freedom, even though we cannot claim to know that they exist, provided these beliefs enhance the moral quality of our lives.
Two works in which Kant develops his deontology (or ethics based on the concept of duty) are the Second Critique (the Critique of Practical Reason) and the Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals. There he posits freedom as if it were grounded in a synthetic a priori truth, on develops a series of moral maxims, or principled rules of conduct. In discovering these rules Kant applies the categorical imperative: "Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." Another formulation of the categorical imperative was: "Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person, or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only." It is noteworthy that Kant based his ethics on duty, not on feelings (such as sympathy for the suffering of others). Kant's attempt to base ethics soley on reason is typical of the thinking of the (18th-century) Enlightenment period.
Tuesday, February 21, 2006
Notes for Thursday, Feb. 23, 2006
Read to p. 206. Locke, Berkeley, Hume.
John Locke (1632-1704) Note that although Locke is cited as "the first of the classical British empiricists," we have already discussed the work of Thomas Hobbes, who is also considered an empiricist. But Hobbes did not work out a full-fledged empiricist philosophy as did Locke.
His epistemology. Like all empiricists, Locke rejected the notion of innate ideas; he replaced it with that of the tabula rasa, or blank slate theory of knowledge. All knowledge is derived from experience. He divided ideas into simple and complex (red is a simple "idea" or sense datum, apple is complex, being made up of several simple "ideas"), and qualities into primary and secondary. This latter distinction can be traced, through Descartes and Galileo, back to Democritus. Primary qualities are inherent in external objects; secondary qualities exist only in the mind, though they are caused by primary qualities. Locke's attitude toward the "substance," which would seem to be a necessary assumption in order for the qualities to be qualities of something, is noncommittal and a bit puzzling within the framework of his general epistemology.
His political theory. His "state of nature" quite different (and luckier) than that of Hobbes. Locke believes in "God-given" rights. Much of the thinking incorporated by the Founding Fathers into our Declaration of Independence comes from Locke. Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. All men are created equal. Note the assumption that man was created, as well as the counterintuitive idea of all men being equal. In what sense?
Berkeley (pronounced "Barkley") 1685-1753
The second British empiricist, who ends up being a sort of subjective idealist. His critique of Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Our only access to primary qualities is via secondary ones. In fact, the so-called primary qualities are really but interpretations of the so-called secondary ones. But if the primary qualities are only interpretations of secondary qualities, then they too must only exist in the mind. Hence Berkeley's principle, esse est percipi (to be is to be perceived). Berkeley's distinction between direct and indirect perception. Direct, the sense data; indirect (or mediate), interpretation of the sense data. Note disappearance of "substance," and growing importance of language, as the medium of intersubjectivity, which overcomes solipsism and moves in the direction of objectivity. God plays the role of assuring that things will remain as we left them (provided nothing has occurred to change their disposition), a role later dubbed the constancy hypothesis.
David Hume (1711-1776)
Author of A Treatise of Human Understanding at age 27. It "fell stillborn from the press," he lamented. Second version published as An Inquiry Concerning the Human Understanding. Hume calls Leibniz's analytic ideas "relations of ideas," and his synthetic ideas "matters of fact." Acting as a good empiricist, Hume labels all relations of ideas as tautological. That is to say, redundant and empty of new information. Only matters of fact "matter." Hume's fork. A series of yes/no questions that we can address to any proposition to determine whether it is analytic (hence trivial because self-evident), synthetic (a matter of fact sort of statement, traceable to sense data, hence possibly true and a real addition to our knowledge of the world) or neither, in which case it is "nonsense." Consider the statement "God exists" in the connection. Hume's critique of causality. Not analytic. Synthetic? Only seemingly. In fact, the notion of causality has three components: priority, contiguity and necessary connection. Only the first two can be traced to sense data (or experience). The necessary connection is not observable, and seems to amount to nothing more than a psychological expectation of what will happen. This is the problem of induction. We cannot "beg the question" (petitio principii) by saying that because event A was always followed by event A in the past it must therefore happen that way in the future. The notion of the self also falls before Hume's fork. Hume leaves philosophy (specifically, metaphysics) in a state of crisis that will be taken up by Emmanuel Kant, the next great philosopher on our program.
John Locke (1632-1704) Note that although Locke is cited as "the first of the classical British empiricists," we have already discussed the work of Thomas Hobbes, who is also considered an empiricist. But Hobbes did not work out a full-fledged empiricist philosophy as did Locke.
His epistemology. Like all empiricists, Locke rejected the notion of innate ideas; he replaced it with that of the tabula rasa, or blank slate theory of knowledge. All knowledge is derived from experience. He divided ideas into simple and complex (red is a simple "idea" or sense datum, apple is complex, being made up of several simple "ideas"), and qualities into primary and secondary. This latter distinction can be traced, through Descartes and Galileo, back to Democritus. Primary qualities are inherent in external objects; secondary qualities exist only in the mind, though they are caused by primary qualities. Locke's attitude toward the "substance," which would seem to be a necessary assumption in order for the qualities to be qualities of something, is noncommittal and a bit puzzling within the framework of his general epistemology.
His political theory. His "state of nature" quite different (and luckier) than that of Hobbes. Locke believes in "God-given" rights. Much of the thinking incorporated by the Founding Fathers into our Declaration of Independence comes from Locke. Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. All men are created equal. Note the assumption that man was created, as well as the counterintuitive idea of all men being equal. In what sense?
Berkeley (pronounced "Barkley") 1685-1753
The second British empiricist, who ends up being a sort of subjective idealist. His critique of Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Our only access to primary qualities is via secondary ones. In fact, the so-called primary qualities are really but interpretations of the so-called secondary ones. But if the primary qualities are only interpretations of secondary qualities, then they too must only exist in the mind. Hence Berkeley's principle, esse est percipi (to be is to be perceived). Berkeley's distinction between direct and indirect perception. Direct, the sense data; indirect (or mediate), interpretation of the sense data. Note disappearance of "substance," and growing importance of language, as the medium of intersubjectivity, which overcomes solipsism and moves in the direction of objectivity. God plays the role of assuring that things will remain as we left them (provided nothing has occurred to change their disposition), a role later dubbed the constancy hypothesis.
David Hume (1711-1776)
Author of A Treatise of Human Understanding at age 27. It "fell stillborn from the press," he lamented. Second version published as An Inquiry Concerning the Human Understanding. Hume calls Leibniz's analytic ideas "relations of ideas," and his synthetic ideas "matters of fact." Acting as a good empiricist, Hume labels all relations of ideas as tautological. That is to say, redundant and empty of new information. Only matters of fact "matter." Hume's fork. A series of yes/no questions that we can address to any proposition to determine whether it is analytic (hence trivial because self-evident), synthetic (a matter of fact sort of statement, traceable to sense data, hence possibly true and a real addition to our knowledge of the world) or neither, in which case it is "nonsense." Consider the statement "God exists" in the connection. Hume's critique of causality. Not analytic. Synthetic? Only seemingly. In fact, the notion of causality has three components: priority, contiguity and necessary connection. Only the first two can be traced to sense data (or experience). The necessary connection is not observable, and seems to amount to nothing more than a psychological expectation of what will happen. This is the problem of induction. We cannot "beg the question" (petitio principii) by saying that because event A was always followed by event A in the past it must therefore happen that way in the future. The notion of the self also falls before Hume's fork. Hume leaves philosophy (specifically, metaphysics) in a state of crisis that will be taken up by Emmanuel Kant, the next great philosopher on our program.
A note on "All bachelors are men."
All bachelors are men. This is an analytic truth, and therefore its negation is self-contradictory. Palmer does not show the reasoning, however. Here it is.
If not all bachelors are men, then some bachelors are not men. But since bachelor means unmarried man, we can substitute "unmarried man" for "bachelor." In doing so, we obtain: Not all unmarried men are men. But an unmarried man is a man. Thus we obtain "Not all men are men", wich is self-contradictory. (This note is intended to clarify Palmer's page 179, in which an intermediary step of the reasoning is omitted.)
If not all bachelors are men, then some bachelors are not men. But since bachelor means unmarried man, we can substitute "unmarried man" for "bachelor." In doing so, we obtain: Not all unmarried men are men. But an unmarried man is a man. Thus we obtain "Not all men are men", wich is self-contradictory. (This note is intended to clarify Palmer's page 179, in which an intermediary step of the reasoning is omitted.)
Sunday, February 19, 2006
Notes for Tuesday, Feb. 21, 2006
Read to p. 184. Hobbes, Spinoza, Leibniz.
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). Hobbes's materialism is obtained by simply canceling one side of Descartes' dualism. (This makes him a bit different from the so-called Greek materialists, in which some matter (e.g. water, for Thales) was thought of more as an element in which various attributes slumbered than as pure matter in the modern sense. He was a "soft determinist." Hobbes's hard realism and pessimism. The impossibility of altruism. Life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short." It is "the war of all against all." Peace is a truce at best. The "social contract" assures a modicum of order. Unjust laws are better than no laws at all, in his opinion. Law and order take precedence over justice. (There may be some grounds for this: law and order might be looked upon as more primary, being the necessary precondition for justice. But from another point of view--namely a teleological one--we could say that justice is the purpose of law and order, and that there is always a danger of this purpose being forgotten.)
Hobbes's best-known work is his Leviathan (an allusion to the giant sea-creature described in Job 40:25-41:26), published in 1651.
INTRODUCTION
Baruch (later Benedict) Spinoza (1634-1677) was excommunicated by the Jews of his native Amsterdam in 1656, because he believed God and Nature to be the same (Deus sive natura), and God to be the mechanical principle of the universe, without personality. He was more rigorously or systematically rationalistic than Descartes (compare their two systems, p. 176). The definition of substance precludes the possibility of their being more than one. Body and mind are two aspects of the same thing. Necesssity reigns in the universe: there is no free will. His most important work, the Ethics, was published posthumously.
Leibniz (1646-1716). Creator of symbolic logic and inventor of calculating machine, co-creator (?) with Sir Isaac Newton of the calculus. Divided all propositions into analytic and synthetic.
Discuss chart on p. 179 in detail. This distinction is important and will be taken up by Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-76). Leibniz draws the surprising conclusion that sub specie aeterntatis (from the point of view of eternity) all true statements are necessarily true, and thus all analytic. Necessary and sufficient reasons. Internal harmony. Leibniz was a polymath, and is the author of the Theodicee, as well as a host of other works on mathematics, logic and the natural sciences. His theory of the monad as the minimal conscious "substance" remains a peculiarity of his philosophy that has not been taken up by subsequent philosophers.
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). Hobbes's materialism is obtained by simply canceling one side of Descartes' dualism. (This makes him a bit different from the so-called Greek materialists, in which some matter (e.g. water, for Thales) was thought of more as an element in which various attributes slumbered than as pure matter in the modern sense. He was a "soft determinist." Hobbes's hard realism and pessimism. The impossibility of altruism. Life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short." It is "the war of all against all." Peace is a truce at best. The "social contract" assures a modicum of order. Unjust laws are better than no laws at all, in his opinion. Law and order take precedence over justice. (There may be some grounds for this: law and order might be looked upon as more primary, being the necessary precondition for justice. But from another point of view--namely a teleological one--we could say that justice is the purpose of law and order, and that there is always a danger of this purpose being forgotten.)
Hobbes's best-known work is his Leviathan (an allusion to the giant sea-creature described in Job 40:25-41:26), published in 1651.
INTRODUCTION
NATURE (the art whereby God hath made and governs the world) is by the art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an artificial animal. For seeing life is but a motion of limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principal part within, why may we not say that all automata (engines that move themselves by springs and wheels as doth a watch) have an artificial life? For what is the heart, but a spring; and the nerves, but so many strings; and the joints, but so many wheels, giving motion to the whole body, such as was intended by the Artificer? Art goes yet further, imitating that rational and most excellent work of Nature, man. For by art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMONWEALTH, or STATE (in Latin, CIVITAS), which is but an artificial man, though of greater stature and strength than the natural, for whose protection and defence it was intended; and in which the sovereignty is an artificial soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body; the magistrates and other officers of judicature and execution, artificial joints; reward and punishment (by which fastened to the seat of the sovereignty, every joint and member is moved to perform his duty) are the nerves, that do the same in the body natural; the wealth and riches of all the particular members are the strength; salus populi (the people's safety) its business; counsellors, by whom all things needful for it to know are suggested unto it, are the memory; equity and laws, an artificial reason and will; concord, health; sedition, sickness; and civil war, death. Lastly, the pacts and covenants, by which the parts of this body politic were at first made, set together, and united, resemble that fiat, or the Let us make man, pronounced by God in the Creation.For a full-text online version, cf. Leviathan
Baruch (later Benedict) Spinoza (1634-1677) was excommunicated by the Jews of his native Amsterdam in 1656, because he believed God and Nature to be the same (Deus sive natura), and God to be the mechanical principle of the universe, without personality. He was more rigorously or systematically rationalistic than Descartes (compare their two systems, p. 176). The definition of substance precludes the possibility of their being more than one. Body and mind are two aspects of the same thing. Necesssity reigns in the universe: there is no free will. His most important work, the Ethics, was published posthumously.
Leibniz (1646-1716). Creator of symbolic logic and inventor of calculating machine, co-creator (?) with Sir Isaac Newton of the calculus. Divided all propositions into analytic and synthetic.
Discuss chart on p. 179 in detail. This distinction is important and will be taken up by Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-76). Leibniz draws the surprising conclusion that sub specie aeterntatis (from the point of view of eternity) all true statements are necessarily true, and thus all analytic. Necessary and sufficient reasons. Internal harmony. Leibniz was a polymath, and is the author of the Theodicee, as well as a host of other works on mathematics, logic and the natural sciences. His theory of the monad as the minimal conscious "substance" remains a peculiarity of his philosophy that has not been taken up by subsequent philosophers.
Sunday, February 12, 2006
Notes for Thursday, 2/16/06
Continental Rationalism and British Empiricism.
Read to p. 168.
René Descartes (1596-1650)
Mathematician and philosopher. Heliocentric vs. geocentric universe, and attendant theological difficulties. The "Copernican Revolution." What was the precise significance of (p. 153) "Ce ne sono quattro!"? Who were the Brothers of the Inquisition? The Inquisition condemned Galileo in 1633; he was rehabilitated in 1992. Descartes methodological doubt. (De omnibus dubitando) The radical search for certitude. Descartes reason for critiquing empirical knowledge. Rejection of the certainty of mathematics. What if God were an "Evil Genius"? Cogito ergo sum (I think, therefore I am.) Even doubting can be subsumed under thinking. Self qua consciousness, the rock bottom certainty of Descartes. But this leaves the door open to the charge of solipsism. Descartes accepts, along with the certainty of self (my mind = myself) certain "innate ideas": self, identity, substance, God. The innate idea of God, or of perfection, paves the way to an ontological (and a priori) proof of the existence of God (cf. p. 165). With the proof of the existence of God, the Evil Genius hypothesis is put to rest.
Descartes replaces "naive realism" with a system whereby perceivable qualities are mental and mathematically measurable ones ("cold, colorless, odorless, soundless, tasteless) to the external world. Hence Cartesian dualism. The problem of interaction. Discuss figure on p. 168, illustrating the Cartesian dispensation.
Descartes the systematizer, but clearly not the originator, of dualism. To what extent is dualism founded? Wherein lie its difficulties?
Read to p. 168.
René Descartes (1596-1650)
Mathematician and philosopher. Heliocentric vs. geocentric universe, and attendant theological difficulties. The "Copernican Revolution." What was the precise significance of (p. 153) "Ce ne sono quattro!"? Who were the Brothers of the Inquisition? The Inquisition condemned Galileo in 1633; he was rehabilitated in 1992. Descartes methodological doubt. (De omnibus dubitando) The radical search for certitude. Descartes reason for critiquing empirical knowledge. Rejection of the certainty of mathematics. What if God were an "Evil Genius"? Cogito ergo sum (I think, therefore I am.) Even doubting can be subsumed under thinking. Self qua consciousness, the rock bottom certainty of Descartes. But this leaves the door open to the charge of solipsism. Descartes accepts, along with the certainty of self (my mind = myself) certain "innate ideas": self, identity, substance, God. The innate idea of God, or of perfection, paves the way to an ontological (and a priori) proof of the existence of God (cf. p. 165). With the proof of the existence of God, the Evil Genius hypothesis is put to rest.
Descartes replaces "naive realism" with a system whereby perceivable qualities are mental and mathematically measurable ones ("cold, colorless, odorless, soundless, tasteless) to the external world. Hence Cartesian dualism. The problem of interaction. Discuss figure on p. 168, illustrating the Cartesian dispensation.
Descartes the systematizer, but clearly not the originator, of dualism. To what extent is dualism founded? Wherein lie its difficulties?
Notes for Valentine's Day, 2006
Wm of Ockham (13-14th Cent.), and the Renaissance Philosophers
(Distrubute copies of articles on cartoon controversy)
Reading: to p. 149. Occam's razor: Do not multiply entities unnecessarily. Palmer's section on the Renaissance philosophers has some historical interest, but is little more than a list of names and dates, interspersed with anecdotal material, that was ill-advisedly added to the 3rd edition. I invite members of the class to comment on whatever aspects of this section they may have found perplexing or intriguing, but otherwise I will ask them only to retain the fact that the sciences made great strides during this period, that it was a time of exploration and conquest by the European nations, and that the notion of humanism (the study of the human, not the divine) originated during these years. The Renaissance (or "rebirth" of Greek and Latin learning), which began in Italy, is considered to be the period that concludes the Middle Ages and heralds the Modern Period. Before moving on to the latter, we will use the time available to discuss any concepts introduced earlier in the course that may call for further discusson.
(Distrubute copies of articles on cartoon controversy)
Reading: to p. 149. Occam's razor: Do not multiply entities unnecessarily. Palmer's section on the Renaissance philosophers has some historical interest, but is little more than a list of names and dates, interspersed with anecdotal material, that was ill-advisedly added to the 3rd edition. I invite members of the class to comment on whatever aspects of this section they may have found perplexing or intriguing, but otherwise I will ask them only to retain the fact that the sciences made great strides during this period, that it was a time of exploration and conquest by the European nations, and that the notion of humanism (the study of the human, not the divine) originated during these years. The Renaissance (or "rebirth" of Greek and Latin learning), which began in Italy, is considered to be the period that concludes the Middle Ages and heralds the Modern Period. Before moving on to the latter, we will use the time available to discuss any concepts introduced earlier in the course that may call for further discusson.
Wednesday, February 08, 2006
Notes for Thursday, 2/9/06
Read to p. 138. Muslim and Jewish philosophers, Faith and Reason, Universals, Thomas Aquinas.
The importance of translations from Hebrew and Arabic in the 11th and 12th centuries. Mohammed born in Mecca in 570, died in Medina in 632.
The main traits of Islam. Monotheism, prayer (5 times daily), brotherhood, forbidding of idolatry, charity toward the poor. Ramadan, pilgrimage to Mecca. Religion dates to early 7th century. Invasion of Christian Spain in 711, continued into France, stopped by Charles Martel. The flowering of Moorish Spain until the reconquest by the Northern Christian powers, which was not complete until 1492. Important scholars during this time period: in Arabic, Averroës (12th century), for his commentaries on Aristotle: in Hebrew, Maimonides (Rambam, from Rabbi Mosche ben Maimon; 1135-1204). The former is noted for his "doctrine of double truth," i.e. the truth of faith and of logic, the latter for his systematization of Aristotle's logic and his Guide of the Perplexed, which attempts to resolve the conflict between science and religion. For both these medieval philosophers, Aristotle was THE philosopher, his sayings referred to as ipse dixits (= literally, "he himself saids").
The problem of faith versus reason. One extreme: Tertullian (from an earlier period, 169-220) who proclaimed "Credo quia absurdum" (="I believe because it is absurd." Note erroneous translation in Palmer, p. 123). The faith/reason controversy in modern times: creationism vs. evolution.
The problem of universals.
Specifically, are universals real? Those who think they are real were called "realists." Those who hold the opposite view, i.e. that words denoting classes of things are merely names (nomen, nominis in Latin, pace Palmer, p. 125), were called nominalists. Note that today the term realist has a very different meaning, more or less the opposite one from that of the medieval polemic. Which side did Wm of Ockham take? Which the Church? The nominalists say that "the system of names creates differences and similarities that only exist in the mind of the speaker or in the system of language itself"A broader question raised by the problem of universals is the ontological status of language and of so-called psychologicall" or mental phenomena.
Thomas Aquinas (1225-74).
His overall task may be said to be the reconciliation between Aristotle and Christianity (as that of Maimonides was to reconcile Aristotle and Judaism). His period marks the ascendancy of Aristotelian over Platonic thought. He was felt to be more modern, more progressive and in keeping with the spirit of the times. The main challenges he faced were the incompatibilities listed on the bottom of page 127. (The earth is eternal, etc.)
Review Thomas's position of that of a moderate realist (129). Universals are "embedded" in particular objects as their "whatness" or essence. We "abstract" the universals from real similarities and differences existing in nature. The abstractions become concepts.
In the area of reason vs. faith, Aquinas distinguishes between philosophy and theology (cf. Venn diagram on p. 130: the intersection of the two is "natural theology." Aquinas believed that it was possible to know at least some truths through both faith and reason (revealed and natural theology). Note the Angelic Doctor's classification of angels, based partially on Genesis 3:24 ("He drove man out, and stationed east of the garden of Eden the cherubim and the fiery ever-turning sword, to guard the way to the tree of life") and Isaiah 6:2 ("Above him stood the seraphim: each one had six wings; with twain he covered his face, and with twain he covered his feet, and with twain he did fly"). Five philosophical arguments for the existence of God: cosmological (a posteriori) arguments.
Thomas's works considered the apogee of scholastic philosophy (= scholasticism, the elucubrations of the Schoolmen, as they are sometimes called).
His solutions to the problem of universals and of faith vs. reason.
The importance of translations from Hebrew and Arabic in the 11th and 12th centuries. Mohammed born in Mecca in 570, died in Medina in 632.
The main traits of Islam. Monotheism, prayer (5 times daily), brotherhood, forbidding of idolatry, charity toward the poor. Ramadan, pilgrimage to Mecca. Religion dates to early 7th century. Invasion of Christian Spain in 711, continued into France, stopped by Charles Martel. The flowering of Moorish Spain until the reconquest by the Northern Christian powers, which was not complete until 1492. Important scholars during this time period: in Arabic, Averroës (12th century), for his commentaries on Aristotle: in Hebrew, Maimonides (Rambam, from Rabbi Mosche ben Maimon; 1135-1204). The former is noted for his "doctrine of double truth," i.e. the truth of faith and of logic, the latter for his systematization of Aristotle's logic and his Guide of the Perplexed, which attempts to resolve the conflict between science and religion. For both these medieval philosophers, Aristotle was THE philosopher, his sayings referred to as ipse dixits (= literally, "he himself saids").
The problem of faith versus reason. One extreme: Tertullian (from an earlier period, 169-220) who proclaimed "Credo quia absurdum" (="I believe because it is absurd." Note erroneous translation in Palmer, p. 123). The faith/reason controversy in modern times: creationism vs. evolution.
The problem of universals.
Specifically, are universals real? Those who think they are real were called "realists." Those who hold the opposite view, i.e. that words denoting classes of things are merely names (nomen, nominis in Latin, pace Palmer, p. 125), were called nominalists. Note that today the term realist has a very different meaning, more or less the opposite one from that of the medieval polemic. Which side did Wm of Ockham take? Which the Church? The nominalists say that "the system of names creates differences and similarities that only exist in the mind of the speaker or in the system of language itself"A broader question raised by the problem of universals is the ontological status of language and of so-called psychologicall" or mental phenomena.
Thomas Aquinas (1225-74).
His overall task may be said to be the reconciliation between Aristotle and Christianity (as that of Maimonides was to reconcile Aristotle and Judaism). His period marks the ascendancy of Aristotelian over Platonic thought. He was felt to be more modern, more progressive and in keeping with the spirit of the times. The main challenges he faced were the incompatibilities listed on the bottom of page 127. (The earth is eternal, etc.)
Review Thomas's position of that of a moderate realist (129). Universals are "embedded" in particular objects as their "whatness" or essence. We "abstract" the universals from real similarities and differences existing in nature. The abstractions become concepts.
In the area of reason vs. faith, Aquinas distinguishes between philosophy and theology (cf. Venn diagram on p. 130: the intersection of the two is "natural theology." Aquinas believed that it was possible to know at least some truths through both faith and reason (revealed and natural theology). Note the Angelic Doctor's classification of angels, based partially on Genesis 3:24 ("He drove man out, and stationed east of the garden of Eden the cherubim and the fiery ever-turning sword, to guard the way to the tree of life") and Isaiah 6:2 ("Above him stood the seraphim: each one had six wings; with twain he covered his face, and with twain he covered his feet, and with twain he did fly"). Five philosophical arguments for the existence of God: cosmological (a posteriori) arguments.
Thomas's works considered the apogee of scholastic philosophy (= scholasticism, the elucubrations of the Schoolmen, as they are sometimes called).
His solutions to the problem of universals and of faith vs. reason.
Monday, February 06, 2006
Notes for 2/07/06
Chapter 4 Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy (Fifth through Fifteenth Centuries).
We will spend three classroom sessions discussing the subject matter of this chapter, a time period of ten centuries. Today we cover Augustine, the Encyclopediasts and John Scotus Eriugena (to p. 117).
Augustine lived during the 4th and 5th centuries (354-430). His best known works are his Confessions (397-8) and The City of God (413-26), both written in Latin. It has been said that he was a great sinner who became a great saint. The first part of his confessions (books 1-9, of 13 books) enumerate his sins; that is one sense of the word "confession," the only one used today in modern parlance. The second part is "a confession of faith," i.e. a declaration of faith. It takes the form of a commentary on the Book of Genesis, with many quotes from and allusions to the Psalms and also various books of the New Testament. He takes Moses to be the divinely inspired author of the Book of Genesis, though modern critical scholarship seems to question this. His commentary on Genesis is intertwined with praise of God and philosophical questions such as the nature of time.
He was a Manichean from age 18 till his conversion to Christianity (the religion of his mother Monica) in 386 (ages 34). Manicheanism, the struggle between equally matched powers of good and evil. ("The Devil made me do it" theory of evil.) Dissatisfied with this, Augustine adopts from Neoplatonism he got the idea that evil does not exist, but is simply the absence of good. After his conversion to Christianity, Augustine sees self-love as the source of evil, and insufficent love of God. If Manicheanism underplayed man's free will, The Pelagian heresy overemphasized the role of free will (as opposed to God's grace) in man's salvation. These are all theological matters, but nonetheless philosophical as well. The problem of squaring God's knowledge of the future with man's free will. If God knows the future, man's freedom is illusory. But if man is not free, it is unjust to hold him responsible for his actions, and God is immoral to punish man for his evil acts. (Similarly, if a man commits horrendous acts "because" of the abuse he or she underwent as a child, is that person "responsible"?) Either God is omniscient or immoral, he is benevolent but ignorant. Augustine's two arguments to get out of the dilemma. (1) God is outside of time, thus knowing all things past, present and future (from our point of view) in an eternal present. (This is interesting, but I must admit I don't see how it solves the dilemma. Whether God knows the future as if it were present or not does not solve the question of predetermination, or as theology puts it, "predestination." His second argument is more pertinent. It is an argument known as compatibility. Freedom and necessity are somehow compatible, as, for example, in Stoicism, in which I contrive to want what is, in such a way that what I want to do and what I can do are made to coincide. Augustine also points out that foreknowledge does not determine what will take place, "any more than my own acts are caused by my knowledge of what I'm going to do" (Palmer, 108). This seems to me quite unclear. Does "knowledge of what I am going to do" mean my intention? If so, it does seem to determine, or at least co-determine, what I will do. Distinguish these concepts: fate (or destiny), predestination, necessity, predetermination, predictibility. What is the difference between fate and the modern notion of a causally-determined universe? What is the difference between freedom and randomness?
The Encyclopediasts (not to be confused with the 18th-century French "Encyclopédistes," such as Diderot and Voltaire, who contributed to the making of the first modern encyclopedias).
Boethius in Italy, Isadore in Spain, and the venerable Bede in England (480-735), men of classical learning in the so-called Dark Ages.
John Scotus Eriugena (ca 810-77). How to understand the totality of reality ("Nature"). First distinction: things that are/things that are not. Deprivations or lacks, but also super-being, i.e. God. The via affirmativa vs. the via negativa. (Correction on bottom of page 112, under via negativa, change We deny the affirmation to We deny the affirmation that God is wise. Discuss John Scotus's categories on p. 113. Note God is in categories 1 and 4.
Saint Anselm (1033-1109).
His ontological argument. It is an a priori argument, i.e. based on logic, not on empirical observation. Work through his argument, as well as Gaunilon's objections. It is said that Immanuel Kant put the argument to rest in the 18th century by showing that it contains a "grammatical" flaw. What does this mean? That a distinction must be made between the use of to be as an existential statement (that something actually exists) and of to be as a copulative verb, merely associating subject and predicate, or a noun and a quality. One could state this differently by saying that existence is not a predicate, not a quality. Note also the unexamined presupposition that it is better to be than not to be. Is "existence" appropriate to God? Consider Jean-Luc Marion's work, God without Being (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1995 reprint): Jean-Luc Marion advances a controversial argument for a God free of all categories of Being. ("Taking a characteristically postmodern stance, Marion challenges a fundamental premise of both metaphysics and neo-Thomist theology: that God, before all else, must be. Rather, he locates a "God without Being" in the realm of agape, of Christian charity or love.") Marion found this concept of a God without (or beyond) Being in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas.
We will spend three classroom sessions discussing the subject matter of this chapter, a time period of ten centuries. Today we cover Augustine, the Encyclopediasts and John Scotus Eriugena (to p. 117).
Augustine lived during the 4th and 5th centuries (354-430). His best known works are his Confessions (397-8) and The City of God (413-26), both written in Latin. It has been said that he was a great sinner who became a great saint. The first part of his confessions (books 1-9, of 13 books) enumerate his sins; that is one sense of the word "confession," the only one used today in modern parlance. The second part is "a confession of faith," i.e. a declaration of faith. It takes the form of a commentary on the Book of Genesis, with many quotes from and allusions to the Psalms and also various books of the New Testament. He takes Moses to be the divinely inspired author of the Book of Genesis, though modern critical scholarship seems to question this. His commentary on Genesis is intertwined with praise of God and philosophical questions such as the nature of time.
He was a Manichean from age 18 till his conversion to Christianity (the religion of his mother Monica) in 386 (ages 34). Manicheanism, the struggle between equally matched powers of good and evil. ("The Devil made me do it" theory of evil.) Dissatisfied with this, Augustine adopts from Neoplatonism he got the idea that evil does not exist, but is simply the absence of good. After his conversion to Christianity, Augustine sees self-love as the source of evil, and insufficent love of God. If Manicheanism underplayed man's free will, The Pelagian heresy overemphasized the role of free will (as opposed to God's grace) in man's salvation. These are all theological matters, but nonetheless philosophical as well. The problem of squaring God's knowledge of the future with man's free will. If God knows the future, man's freedom is illusory. But if man is not free, it is unjust to hold him responsible for his actions, and God is immoral to punish man for his evil acts. (Similarly, if a man commits horrendous acts "because" of the abuse he or she underwent as a child, is that person "responsible"?) Either God is omniscient or immoral, he is benevolent but ignorant. Augustine's two arguments to get out of the dilemma. (1) God is outside of time, thus knowing all things past, present and future (from our point of view) in an eternal present. (This is interesting, but I must admit I don't see how it solves the dilemma. Whether God knows the future as if it were present or not does not solve the question of predetermination, or as theology puts it, "predestination." His second argument is more pertinent. It is an argument known as compatibility. Freedom and necessity are somehow compatible, as, for example, in Stoicism, in which I contrive to want what is, in such a way that what I want to do and what I can do are made to coincide. Augustine also points out that foreknowledge does not determine what will take place, "any more than my own acts are caused by my knowledge of what I'm going to do" (Palmer, 108). This seems to me quite unclear. Does "knowledge of what I am going to do" mean my intention? If so, it does seem to determine, or at least co-determine, what I will do. Distinguish these concepts: fate (or destiny), predestination, necessity, predetermination, predictibility. What is the difference between fate and the modern notion of a causally-determined universe? What is the difference between freedom and randomness?
The Encyclopediasts (not to be confused with the 18th-century French "Encyclopédistes," such as Diderot and Voltaire, who contributed to the making of the first modern encyclopedias).
Boethius in Italy, Isadore in Spain, and the venerable Bede in England (480-735), men of classical learning in the so-called Dark Ages.
John Scotus Eriugena (ca 810-77). How to understand the totality of reality ("Nature"). First distinction: things that are/things that are not. Deprivations or lacks, but also super-being, i.e. God. The via affirmativa vs. the via negativa. (Correction on bottom of page 112, under via negativa, change We deny the affirmation to We deny the affirmation that God is wise. Discuss John Scotus's categories on p. 113. Note God is in categories 1 and 4.
Saint Anselm (1033-1109).
His ontological argument. It is an a priori argument, i.e. based on logic, not on empirical observation. Work through his argument, as well as Gaunilon's objections. It is said that Immanuel Kant put the argument to rest in the 18th century by showing that it contains a "grammatical" flaw. What does this mean? That a distinction must be made between the use of to be as an existential statement (that something actually exists) and of to be as a copulative verb, merely associating subject and predicate, or a noun and a quality. One could state this differently by saying that existence is not a predicate, not a quality. Note also the unexamined presupposition that it is better to be than not to be. Is "existence" appropriate to God? Consider Jean-Luc Marion's work, God without Being (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1995 reprint): Jean-Luc Marion advances a controversial argument for a God free of all categories of Being. ("Taking a characteristically postmodern stance, Marion challenges a fundamental premise of both metaphysics and neo-Thomist theology: that God, before all else, must be. Rather, he locates a "God without Being" in the realm of agape, of Christian charity or love.") Marion found this concept of a God without (or beyond) Being in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas.
Wednesday, February 01, 2006
Notes for Thursday, 2/2/06
1. Compete comments on Aristotle's ethics, politics and aesthetics.
2. A note on Ty's objection to question 8 of Quiz 2. "One of the charges brought against Socrates was that he often tried to make the weaker argument appear the stronger").
Read to p. 99. The Hellenistic and Roman Periods. Epicureanism, Stoicism, Neoplatonism.
Epicurus (4th-3rd cent. BCE) The meaning of Epicurianism today (hedonism), by contrast with the philosophy of Epicurus himself. A follower of Democritus. The equation of happiness with pleasure. The classifications of desire. Pleasure defined negatively (as the absence of pain). Epicurus inspired the later Roman poet Lucretius (341-270), the author of De Natura Rerum ( = On the Nature of Things), a poem that combines lyric enthusiasm with scientific theory. One of the lines from it of which I am particularly fond is (2.79) "et quasi cursores vitai lampada tradunt," i.e." like runners they pass on the torch of life." A metaphor from the Athenian lampadedromy.
Stoicism. Founded in Greece by Zeno of Cyprus. Stoa = portico. Acting in accordance with nature. Reality is perfect. If freedom is the unity of will and ability (i.e. being able to do what you want), we must want what the universe wants. It is not so much a getting what you want as a wanting what you get. Similarities (resignation) and differences (suicide) with Christianity.
Famous Roman stoics. Seneca, a dramatist (4-65), Epictetus a freedman, and Marcus Aurelius (121-180), an Emperor.
Neoplatonism. A mystic form of Platonism that had considerable influence on Christianity. Consult diagrams on p. 97.
2. A note on Ty's objection to question 8 of Quiz 2. "One of the charges brought against Socrates was that he often tried to make the weaker argument appear the stronger").
Read to p. 99. The Hellenistic and Roman Periods. Epicureanism, Stoicism, Neoplatonism.
Epicurus (4th-3rd cent. BCE) The meaning of Epicurianism today (hedonism), by contrast with the philosophy of Epicurus himself. A follower of Democritus. The equation of happiness with pleasure. The classifications of desire. Pleasure defined negatively (as the absence of pain). Epicurus inspired the later Roman poet Lucretius (341-270), the author of De Natura Rerum ( = On the Nature of Things), a poem that combines lyric enthusiasm with scientific theory. One of the lines from it of which I am particularly fond is (2.79) "et quasi cursores vitai lampada tradunt," i.e." like runners they pass on the torch of life." A metaphor from the Athenian lampadedromy.
Stoicism. Founded in Greece by Zeno of Cyprus. Stoa = portico. Acting in accordance with nature. Reality is perfect. If freedom is the unity of will and ability (i.e. being able to do what you want), we must want what the universe wants. It is not so much a getting what you want as a wanting what you get. Similarities (resignation) and differences (suicide) with Christianity.
Famous Roman stoics. Seneca, a dramatist (4-65), Epictetus a freedman, and Marcus Aurelius (121-180), an Emperor.
Neoplatonism. A mystic form of Platonism that had considerable influence on Christianity. Consult diagrams on p. 97.
